In Stackelberg security games, information about the attacker's type (i.e., payoff parameters) are essential for computing the optimal strategy for the defender to commit to. While such information can be incomplete or uncertain in practice, algorithms have been proposed to learn the optimal defender commitment from the attacker's best responses during the defender's interaction with the follower. In this paper, we show that, however, such algorithms might be easily manipulated by a strategic attacker, who intentionally sends fake best responses to mislead the learning algorithm into producing a strategy that benefits the attacker but, very likely, hurts the defender. As a key finding in this paper, attacker manipulation normally leads to the defender playing only her maximin strategy, which effectively renders the learning algorithm useless as to compute the maximin strategy requires no information about the other player at all. To address this issue, we propose a game-theoretic framework at a higher level, in which the defender commits to a policy that allows her to specify a particular strategy to play conditioned on the learned attacker type. We then provide a polynomialtime algorithm to compute the optimal defender policy, and in addition, a heuristic approach that applies even when the attacker type space is infinite or completely unknown. It is shown through simulations that our approaches can improve in the defender's utility significantly as compared to the situation when attacker manipulations are ignored.
Introduction
Stackelberg security games (SSGs) are Stackelberg game models that are used to derive optimal strategies of security resource allocation in the face of strategic adversaries. In the AI community, the line of works applying SSG models has achieved many high-impact goals in the past decade, providing algorithms for systems in use by the US Transportation Security Administration, the Los Angeles Airport, the US Cost Guard, the Federal Air Marshal Service, to assist with the protection of high-profile infrastructures, and public and natural resources [Tambe, 2011] .
The standard solution concept of SSG, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) captures the situation where a defender (the leader) commits to her optimal strategy, assuming that an attacker (the follower) will respond optimally to her commitment. Algorithms have been developed (for the defender) to compute SSEs in different models when complete information about the attacker's type (i.e., his payoff parameters) is provided. While such information may be incomplete in many real environments, approaches have also been proposed for the defender to learn the optimal commitment through interacting with the attacker: by committing to a series of carefully chosen defender strategies and observing the attacker's best responses to these strategies [Letchford et al., 2009; Blum et al., 2014; Haghtalab et al., 2016; Roth et al., 2016; Peng et al., 2019] . The optimality of the learned commitment thus relies crucially on the assumption of a truthful attacker, who responds optimally to queries of the learning algorithms according to his actual payoffs. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that the attacker will indeed behave truthfully. A strategic attacker can tamper the defender's learning algorithm by sending fake best responses to its queries, typically by imitating the responses of a different attacker type; the defender will learn an optimal commitment but against the imitated type as a result, which is likely to be suboptimal against the actual attacker type.
As we show in this paper, the attacker has strong incentives to manipulate the defender's learning algorithm. The adversarial nature of SSGs also gives rise to a surprising key finding of this paper, that a manipulative attacker would be incentivized to imitate a type that makes the game zero-sum. A credulous defender would then learn only her maximin strategy (which is exactly the SSE strategy in a zero-sum game), which effectively renders the whole learning process meaningless as computing the maximin strategy requires no information about the other player's payoff parameters at all! Motivated by this issue, we study what a defender can do to reduce her loss due to such manipulations. We put forward a game-theoretic framework at a higher level, in which the defender commits to a policy that allows her to specify a strategy to play conditioned on the learned information. The framework generalizes the playbook of the defender in the current SSG model, where she always plays the SSE strategy she learns. A strategic attacker then takes into account the defender's policy, choosing optimally what he wants the defender to learn so that the defender's policy outputs a strategy that benefits him the most.
Under this framework, we make several other contributions. (i) We propose a reasonable measure of the quality of a policy. (ii) We then develop a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal policy with respect to the proposed measure. (iii) In addition, we also provide a heuristic approach which applies to an infinite or even unknown space of attacker types; the approach is inspired by the quantal response model and reveals the rationality of behaving in a boundedly rational manner in the presence of a manipulative attacker. (iv) It is shown through simulations that our approaches can improvement in the defender's utility significantly in randomly generated games as compared to the situation when attacker manipulations are ignored. It is worth noting that, though our work is based on the specific security game model, the framework we propose also applies to general Stackelberg games that have a wider range of applications. The SSG model offers us an appropriate level of specification that enables us to derive a richer set of results than from a more general model -consider, e.g., when the interests of the leader and the follower completely align, there is simply no incentive for the follower to manipulate the leader -while it also captures sufficiently many real-world applications of significant practical value.
Additional Related Work Manipulation of the defender's (leader's) learning algorithm remains an unexplored area in the literature, though there are many papers focusing on designing the learning algorithms. In addition to the aforementioned works on learning from the attacker's best responses [Letchford et al., 2009; Blum et al., 2014; Haghtalab et al., 2016; Roth et al., 2016; Peng et al., 2019] , a couple of papers also take the regret-minimization approach and design online learning algorithms for the defender to play in a repeated game [Balcan et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2016] . Our work takes a middle-ground approach between the overoptimistic assumption of a truthful attacker adopted by the former works, and the pessimistic assumption of a worst-case non-strategic opponent by the latter.
Our work is related to poisoning attacks in adversarial machine learning, where an attacker manipulates the training data (in our model, their payoffs) to undermine the performance of learning algorithms [Dalvi et al., 2004; Barreno et al., 2010; Biggio et al., 2012; Li et al., 2016; Steinhardt et al., 2017] . In a broader sense, handling manipulation can also be seen as playing against information uncertainty. For Stackelberg games, algorithms have been designed to compute robust leader strategies when the leader can estimate the follower's payoffs within a certain interval [Letchford et al., 2009; Kiekintveld et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 2014] , or has probabilistic belief about the follower's types [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006; Jain et al., 2008; Pita et al., 2009] . Unlike in our model, it is assumed that the attacker (follower) is essentially truthful and will not strategically make use of information uncertainty to manipulate the defender/leader in these models.
SSG Preliminaries
An SSG is played between a defender (the leader) and an attacker (the follower). The defender allocates m security resources to a set of targets T = {1, . . . , n} (n > m), and the attacker wants to attack the targets. In the pure strategy setting, a defender strategy is a resource allocation. An attack on a target i is unsuccessful as long as one resource is allocated to i, in which case the attacker receives a penalty p a i , and the defender a reward r d i . Conversely, an attack on target i is successful if no resource is allocated to i, in which case the attacker receives a reward r a i , and the defender a penalty p d i . It is assumed that r a i > p a i and r d i > p d i for all i ∈ T , in the sense that the attacker always prefers a successful attack, and the defender prefers the opposite.
More generally, the defender can commit to a mixed strategy (i.e., a probability distribution of pure strategies), from which she samples a pure strategy to play. By the standard assumption, the attacker is now able to observe the defender's mixed strategy through surveillance but not the instantiated pure strategy. A defender mixed strategy can be represented more compactly as a coverage (vector) c = (c i ) i∈T , with each c i representing the probability that target i is protected. We will stick to this representation in the paper and use the terms coverage and defender mixed strategy interchangeably. Under the constraint that the defender can use at most m resources in a pure strategy, the space of feasible mixed strategies is C = {c ∈ R n : 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, i∈T c i ≤ m}; any coverage vector in C can be implemented as a distribution of pure strategies each involving at most m resources, and any such distribution results in a coverage vector in C. Let u d (c, i) and u a (c, i) be the expected utilities of the defender and the attacker, respectively, when the defender plays a mixed strategy c and the attacker attacks target i. With slight abuse of notation, we write
It is worth noting that the defender's utility function is strictly increasing with respect to c i , and attacker's utility function strictly decreasing. The strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of SSGs. In an SSE, the defender plays an optimal mixed strategy, accounting that the attacker always responds optimally with a pure strategy after observing the defender's strategy; ties are assumed to be broken in favor of the defender when the attacker has multiple optimal choices, and this assumption is justified by the fact that the defender can normally induce strict preference of the attacker by reducing protection to her favored target by an infinitesimal amount. 1 Formally, a strategy profile (ĉ,î) forms an SSE if:
where BR(c) is the attacker's best response set, the set of best responses to c, i.e., BR(c) = arg max i∈T u a (c, i).
An SSE always exists and can be computed in polynomial time, e.g., using a multiple-LP approach [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006] .
In this paper, we will refer to a set of attacker payoff parameters (r a , p a ) as the attacker's type. To distinguish, we extend Eq. (2) and denote by u a θ the utility function of an attacker of type θ, i.e., for
Definition of the best response set is extended similarly, i.e., BR θ (c) = arg max i∈T u a θ (c, i). We will refer to an SSE in a game where the attacker has (true) type θ an SSE on attacker type θ. Example 1. Consider an SSG where the defender allocates one security guard to protect two targets A and B. Thus, the defender has three pure strategies: assigning the guard to protect A or B, or sending the guard on vacation; the corresponding mixed strategy space is C = {c ∈ R 2 : 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, c 1 + c 2 ≤ 1}. The attacker can choose to attack A or B. The targets are of equal importance to the defender, such that a successful attack on either target i ∈ {A, B} results in utility p d i = −1 for the defender, and an unsuccessful one results in r d i = 0. For the attacker, the payoffs are r a A = 1, r a B = 3, and p a A = p a B = 0. The bi-matrix representation of the game is shown below, with the defender and the attacker being the row and column players, respectively.
The SSE of this game can be found using the indifference rule, i.e., by identifying a point where the attacker is indifferent of attacking A and B, while the defender cannot improve coverage of the targets any further (however, not in every game can an SSE be found in this way). In the only SSE of this game, the defender protects (A, B) with probabilitiesĉ = (3/4, 1/4) (which is equivalent to a mixed strategy x = (3/4, 1/4, 0) as in the bi-matrix representation), by which the attacker finds his best response set to be BR(ĉ) = {A, B}, so by the SSE tie-breaking assumption, responds in favor of the defender by attacking A. The defender gets utility u d (ĉ, A) = −1/4 and the attacker gets u a (ĉ, A) = 3/4.
Manipulating a Learning Defender
We investigate how a strategic attacker can manipulate the defender's learning algorithm. We begin with a warm-up example of an attacker manipulation below.
Example 2. Consider now the attacker in Example 1 plays a trick, pretending to have payoff r a A = 1 (all other parameters remain the same) and "best" responding to queries of the defender's learning algorithm according to this fake parameter. Let the fake attacker type be β. The defender will be quietly misled into learning an SSE strategy against β, which isc = (1/2, 1/2). Now that BR β (c) = {A, B}, the attacker then responds (still in favor of the defender) by attacking A, resulting in his utility to increase to 3/2 for the attacker, but the defender's utility to drop to −1/2. There is a loss of 1/4 in the defender's utility compared to the truthful case! Observe that in the above example, the attacker actually convinces the defender to play a zero-sum game with him. Interestingly, it turns out that this is not a coincidence but a general phenomenon in SSGs. We will show next that it is optimal for the attacker to mislead the defender into learning only her maximin strategy, which is exactly her SSE strategy in a zero-sum game.
Optimal Report of the Attacker
A couple of "disclaimers" would be appropriate before our analysis: First, we only focus on the players' utilities in the final realization stage of the game, i.e., in the fake SSE the defender learns. The cost for the players in the learning process is omitted as we expect the learning algorithms to be efficient and the subsequent play in the learned SSE to repeat in a sufficiently long period; this simplification is in line with previous works on designing learning algorithms for the defender/leader (e.g., [Letchford et al., 2009; Blum et al., 2014; Peng et al., 2019] ). Without loss of generality, we view the learning process as a reporting step in which the attacker simply reports his payoff parameters to the defender. Second, we assume that the attacker's behavior conforms to the reported type throughout the game. This means that the attacker may be playing a suboptimal response in the fake SSE in the realization stage of the game. Although this also means that the attacker may now exploit the defender for an even higher utility by switching back to his true best response, since such behavior change will inevitably make the defender aware of the manipulation and introduce further complication to our model, we adopt this cleaner modeling approach to capture the essence of the manipulation problem, which also makes the model more amenable for formal analysis.
The following program computes the optimal reporting strategy of an attacker of true type θ.
where Θ = {(r, p) ∈ R n×n : r i > p i for all i ∈ T } is the set of types that adhere to the basic assumption that an attacker always prefers a successful attack (we will also show a stronger result that allows for more strict specifications of Θ). In the program, the attacker reports a fake type β that results in the defender to learn a strategyĉ which, by (3a), forms an SSE (on attacker type β) along with a best responseî (of type β). An optimal solution thus yields a reporting strategy for the attacker, that maximizes his true utility u a θ . Based on the program, our next key result Theorem 3 reveals that it is always optimal for the attacker to mislead the defender into playing her maximin strategy. This is surprising as the defender essentially learns no information: to obtain the maximin strategy requires no knowledge about the other player's payoffs at all! Theorem 3. There exists an optimal solution (β, z, t) of Program (3) such that z is a maximin strategy of the defender, i.e., z ∈ arg max c∈C min i∈T u d (c, i).
Proof. Let c ∈ arg max c∈C min i∈T u d (c, i) be a maximin strategy of the defender, and we let u = max c∈C min i∈T u d (c, i) = min i∈T u d (c, i) be the corresponding maximin utility. Consider a solution (β, z, t) such that:
• t ∈ BR θ (z) is an arbitrary best response of the attacker (whose true type is θ);
, and
We show that z is a maximin defender strategy, (β, z, t) is a feasible solution and it is optimal. Below are two observations about (β, z, t).
(i) For all i = t, the payoffs defined by r and p are exactly the negative of the defender's payoffs; thus, u a β (c, i) = −u d (c, i) for any c ∈ C. This does not hold for i = t, but given that
(ii) For all i ∈ T , since z i = max 0,
To see that it also satisfies (3a), observe that
Combining this with observations (i) and (ii) gives
Second, for all i ∈ T such that z i > 0, the fact that
Now that z ∈ C and t ∈ BR β (z), suppose towards a contradiction that (3a) is not satisfied, i.e.,
Theorem 3 can be further strengthened under the assumption that a defender maximin strategy c is fully mixed, i.e., 0 < c i < 1 for all i ∈ T . 2 The assumption is mild as it is normally expected that no target would be too valueless to the extent that the defender would leave it wide open for the attacker to attack, while on the other hand, resources are normally insufficient to allow targets to be fully protected. The strengthening is two-fold: under this assumption, (i) the defender's only SSE strategy induced by the attacker's optimal report is her maximin strategy, so the equilibrium selection issue that arises when a report can induce multiple defender SSE strategies is avoided; (ii) in particular, one optimal reporting strategy of the attacker is a type that makes the game zero-sum, so the result holds even for a more strict specification of Θ (e.g., when the defender has a more precise prior knowledge about possible types of the attacker) as long as it contains the zero-sum attacker type (indeed, it is very natural for an attacker to be a zero-sum type given the adversarial nature of security games). We state the result in Theorem 4; the proof can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 4. Suppose a maximin strategy c of the defender is fully mixed, i.e., 0 < c i < 1 for all i ∈ T . Let (β, z, t) be an arbitrary optimal solution of Program (3). Then for every SSE (ĉ,î) ∈ arg max c∈C,i∈BR β (c) u d (c, i) on type β, it holds thatĉ = c. In addition, there exists an optimal solution
Handling Manipulations -a New Playbook and the Challenges
We have seen the consequence of attacker manipulations. Now we explore ways to handle them.
Recall our analysis above. The key to the success of the attacker's trick is the naive playbook the defender follows -play the learned optimal commitment as is. It appears that the defender can be more strategic. Consider Example 2. Suppose the defender tweaks her strategy slightly, playing instead c = (1/2, 49/100) even when she learns that (1/2, 1/2) is the optimal commitment, the attacker, who imitates a type β that makes the game zero-sum, would then have to attack B as now the best response set of β is BR β (c) = {B}. Consequently, the attacker can only obtain utility 1/2, which is even lower than his utility 3/4 in the truthful situation. Thus, if the defender announces that she will play, e.g., (c 1 , c 2 − 1 100 ) whenever she learns that (c 1 , c 2 ) is the optimal commitment, the attacker will at least lose the incentive to deceive the defender that playing the maximin strategy is optimal. The question then becomes: what is the best the defender can achieve by revising her playbook in similar ways? We formalize this approach as a commitment to a policy and analyse the challenges toward answering this question next.
Commitment to a Policy
Formally, a policy is a function π : Θ → C × T that maps a reported attacker type to an outcome (c, i) ∈ C × T . An outcome (c, i) is a strategy profile consisting of a defender strategy c and a best response i ∈ BR θ (c) of the reported attacker type θ. 3 As an example, the way the defender plays when she ignores attacker manipulation can itself be viewed as a policy, which maps every reported attacker type θ to an SSE on θ; we will refer to this policy as the SSE policy.
A defender policy can be observed or learned by the attacker through constant interaction with the defender. In response to a policy, a strategic attacker of true type θ then chooses to report the optimal type β * ∈ arg max β∈Θ u a θ (π(β)) that will maximize his utility in the realization stage of the game. At a higher level, this can be seen as a Stackelberg game in which the defender commits to a policy and the attacker reports optimally in response to this policy.
To find the optimal policy we face the following challenges. First, what is a good measure of the quality of a policy? When there is no prior information about the attacker's type, worst-case analysis seems to be appropriate. However, as Proposition 5 suggests, taking the worst-case defender utility as the measure leaves us little room for improvement: the SSE policy already achieves the best worstcase utility when Θ contains the zero-sum attacker type (intuitively, no policy can obtain more than the maximin utility on such an attacker type). For this reason, we propose an alternative measurement termed the efficiency of policy (EoP) .
As in Definition 6, the EoP compares the actual utility the defender obtains on each attacker type with what the defender should have obtained in an SSE had the attacker been truthful. A higher value of EoP indicates less impact of attacker manipulation on the defender's utility and the value of EoP always lies in between 0 and 1 according to Proposition 7. Without loss of generality, we will hereafter assume Θ -previously defined as the set of types the attacker is allowed to report -to also be the set of the attacker's possible true types, which is the common knowledge of both the defender and the attacker.
Proposition 5. Let c be the defender's maximin strategy, and u = min i∈T u d (c, i) be the corresponding maximin utility. For any policy π, let γ ∈ Θ be the optimal reporting strategy of an attacker of true type
Proof. Let (z, j) = π(β), i.e., the outcome a type-β attacker would get if he reports truthfully. By definition, we have j ∈ BR β (z). The defender's maximin strategy is exactly her SSE strategy in a zero-sum game, and (c, i) forms an SSE for any i ∈ BR β (c) (see Lemma A-2 in the appendix). Thus,
Since β makes the game zero-sum, we have
Therefore, suppose towards a contradiction that u d (π(γ)) > u. We would have
which implies that the attacker would be strictly better-off reporting β and contradicts the assumption that γ is an optimal reporting strategy of a type-β attacker.
Definition 6 (Efficiency of policy (EoP)). Let the defender's payoff parameters be normalized to be in [0, 1]. For each θ ∈ Θ, let β π θ = arg max β∈Θ u a θ (π(β)) be the attacker's optimal reporting strategy in response to a policy π (let ties be broken in favor of the defender). The efficiency of π on attacker type
is the defender's utility in an SSE on type θ. The (overall) efficiency of π is EoP(π) = min θ∈Θ eop θ (π).
Proposition 7. For any feasible defender policy π, it holds that
Proof. Clearly, EoP(π) ≥ 0 as the payoffs are normalized to be in [0, 1]. We show that EoP(π) ≤ 1.
Let γ be the best reporting strategy of a type-β attacker in response to π. For the outcome (c, i) = π(γ) to be feasible, we must have i ∈ BR γ (c); thus,
(same as in Definition 6,û(θ) = max c∈C,i∈BR θ (c) u d (c, i) denotes the defender's utility in an SSE on attacker type θ). It follows that
Another challenge for us is the representation of the defender policy, which is a functional variable in the optimization problem. For a computationally feasible formulation, we follow a standard modeling approach in the literature and consider a discrete version of the problem where the type set Θ is finite. This approach has been widely adopted to model Bayesian games (e.g., [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006; Jain et al., 2008; Pita et al., 2009] ). A finite type set can be seen as an approximation to the continuous type space, while in some scenarios attacker types might also be discrete by nature. For example, in defense against poaching, payoffs of the attacker (poachers) may depend on the type of animal products they are interested in, which falls in a finite set. In addition to this standard approach, we also propose a heuristic policy inspired by the quantal response model, which applies to an infinite or even unknown type set. We present these approaches in the next two sections.
Algorithm 1: Decide if there exists a policy π such that EoP(π) ≥ ξ.
For each
2. Sort attacker types in Θ byû(θ), so thatû(θ 1 ) ≥û(θ 2 ) · · · ≥û(θ λ ).
3. For each ℓ = 1, . . . , λ, set (z θ ℓ , t θ ℓ ) as follows:
for all i ∈ T .
• Let z
4. Let π ← (z θ , t θ ) θ∈Θ . If EoP(π) ≥ ξ, return yes; otherwise, return no.
Optimal Policy for Finite Attacker Types
For a finite set of attacker types, a defender policy is simply a list of λ = |Θ| outcomes; we will therefore also write a policy as π = (c θ , i θ ) θ∈Θ , meaning that π(θ) = (c θ , i θ ) for each θ ∈ Θ. Our analysis reveals that the problem of optimizing the EoP is NP-hard in general Stackelberg games (see Section A.4 of the appendix), but thanks to the special game structure, the problem admits a polynomial-time algorithm when the underlying game is a security game.
A Polynomial-time Algorithm
We consider the decision version of the optimization problem: for a given value ξ, decide whether any defender policy π achieves EoP(π) ≥ ξ. Trivially, once we have an efficient algorithm for this decision problem, the best EoP can be found efficiently using binary search (particularly, we already know that the value always lies in [0, 1]). Our algorithm for this decision problem, presented as Algorithm 1, is constructive and yields a satisfying policy when there exists one. In the remainder of this section, we will let Θ = {θ 1 , . . . , θ λ } such that θ 1 , . . . , θ λ are ordered by the SSE utility they offer the defender in the truthful setting, i.e.,û(θ 1 ) ≥û(θ 2 ) · · · ≥û(θ λ ); the ordered types can be obtained efficiently given that the SSEs can be computed in polynomial time. We call a policy ℓ-compatible if truthful report is incentivized for every attacker type θ j , j ≤ ℓ; see Definition 8. The correctness of Algorithm 1 is shown in Theorem 10, which is based on the core observation stated in Lemma 9. Intuitively, if there exists a satisfying policy π (which we do not need to know beforehand), we can iteratively replace the ℓ-th outcome of π and obtain a new satisfying policyπ. The replacement helps us pin down the ℓ-th outcome, and eventually we are able to obtain a complete policy with the desired EoP. For readability, we provide a proof sketch for Lemma 9; the full proof can be found in the appendix.
Definition 8.
A policy π is ℓ-compatible (0 ≤ ℓ ≤ λ), if in response to π, it is optimal for every attacker type θ ∈ {θ 1 , . . . , θ ℓ } to report truthfully, i.e., u a θ (π(θ)) ≥ u a θ (π(β)) for all β ∈ Θ.
Lemma 9. Suppose that there exists a policy π = (c θ , i θ ) θ∈Θ , EoP(π) ≥ ξ, and π is (ℓ − 1)-compatible (1 ≤ ℓ ≤ λ). Let (ĉ,î) be an arbitrary SSE on attacker type θ ℓ . Let h be such that
and t ∈ BR θ ℓ (h). Then the policyπ such thatπ(θ)
, is feasible and ℓ-compatible, and EoP(π) ≥ ξ.
Proof Sketch. In the definition of h i , the quantity
sures that the modification of π(θ) does not give any type θ ∈ {θ 1 , . . . , θ ℓ−1 } (who reports truthfully in response to π) an incentive to change their report to θ ℓ , as
. It can be proven that truthful report is indeed incentivized for type θ ℓ by the above specification of t. Finally, taking z i = min{ĉ i , h i } guarantees the feasibility of (z, t): a defender strategy z with z i >ĉ i for all i cannot be feasible, as the contrary will contradicts the fact that (ĉ,î) is an SSE.
Theorem 10. In time polynomial in m, n, and |Θ|, Algorithm 1 either outputs a policy π with EoP(π) ≥ ξ, or decides correctly that no such policy exists. The policy generated is λ-compatible.
Proof. The algorithm runs in λ iterations and its polynomial runtime is readily seen.
Trivially, when no policy can achieve EoP ξ, we have EoP(π) < ξ in Step 4; Algorithm 1 will decide correctly that no satisfying policy exists.
Suppose that there exists a satisfying π * , EoP(π * ) ≥ ξ. For each ℓ = 1, . . . , λ, let π ℓ be a policy
. . , θ λ } ; thus, π λ is exactly the policy generated by Algorithm 1. Applying Lemma 9, it follows that π ℓ is ℓ-compatible and EoP(π ℓ ) ≥ ξ for each ℓ = 1, . . . , λ; in particular, π λ is λ-compatible and EoP(π λ ) ≥ ξ. Algorithm 1 outputs π λ .
As a final remark, the policy generated by Algorithm 1 is also λ-compatible, meaning that it always incentivizes all attacker types to report truthfully. The advantage of such a policy is that even if the attacker may occasionally act truthfully, the quality of the policy will not be affected.
Beyond Finite Attacker Types
In this section, we present a heuristic approach to deal with continuous or even unknown type spaces. The approach is inspired by the quantal response (QR) equilibrium -a concept developed to study bounded rationality of players in a game [McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995] . In a QR equilibrium, players are assumed to play not only their optimal pure strategy, but also every other strategy with some probability. The probability of a strategy being chosen is positively related to the utility the player gets from playing that strategy.
QR Policy -the Rationality behind Bounded Rationality
Recall that in an SSE, the defender induces the attacker to attack a target in his best response set. In the truthful setting, the attacker is indifferent of which exact target is chosen since all those in the best response set offer him the best utility. In the deceptive setting, however, this is not true: the attacker only pretends to have the equal utility over the (fake) best response set, while in fact he has to benefit from the defender inducing him to a particular target he wants. Following this observation, the idea of the QR policy is to penalize the attacker for reporting a fake best response set, by inducing him to attack every target in the best response set with some probability. The QR policy is as follows.
QR Policy. For each type θ, letĉ θ be the defender strategy in an SSE on attacker type θ. A QR policy π QR maps a reported type θ to a distribution over outcomes in {(ĉ θ , i) : i ∈ BR θ (ĉ θ )}; the probability
, (i.e., the softmax function) where ϕ > 0 is a constant parameter ϕ used to adjust the rationality level of the player: when ϕ → 0, a player exhibits a fully non-rational behavior, playing each strategy uniformly at random; when ϕ → +∞, a player becomes perfectly rational, choosing the optimal strategy with probability approaching 1. We refer to the QR policy with a specific ϕ the QR-ϕ.
A defender who uses π QR then samples an outcome from the distribution π QR (θ) when θ is reported. The players' now consider their expected utility over the outcome distribution, e.g., for the defender:
The EoP is defined accordingly with the above utility definition. Sinceĉ θ and σ θ are independent of the type set Θ, a QR policy can be implemented on-thefly for the type reported, and is thus able to handle infinite or unknown type spaces.
While the QR model adds further randomization to the defender's commitment, the softmax function that defines σ θ (i) strikes a balance and loosely strings the defender's choice of induced attacker actions to the optimal one. In some sense, this is the rationality behind behaving in such a boundedly rational manner. We evaluate the performance of the QR policy through simulations in the next section.
Simulations
We run experiments to evaluate our approaches in randomly generated games. All results are obtained on a platform with a 2.60 GHz CPU and a 8.0 GB memory. To generate reward and penalty parameters, for each target, we generate a pair of numbers uniformly at random in [0, 1], and let the larger one be the reward and the smaller one be the penalty. The payoff parameters of each attacker type are also tuned using the well-known covariant game model [Nudelman et al., 2004] as follows. We set a control parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1], and shift each payoff parameter x towards the corresponding one y of a zerosum attacker type (i.e., a type that has the negative payoffs of the defender), such that after the shift x becomes x ′ = (1 − ρ) · x + ρ · y. Therefore, when ρ = 1, the game is exactly zero-sum, and when ρ = 0, the attacker's payoffs are completely random. Without loss of generality, all our evaluations are conducted with a finite type set, so that when we evaluate EoP, the attacker's optimal reporting strategy can be computed by enumerating all the possible types. Each result shown is averaged over the results of 50 runs.
EoP Comparison. The primary goal of the experiments is to compare the EoP achieved by our approaches, as well as that by the SSE policy (i.e., the situation when attacker manipulation is ignored) as a benchmark. The first set of results is shown in Figure 1. Figures (a)-(c) show the variance of EoP with respect to ρ, with type sets of different scales. Except for the QR policy with ϕ = 10, the performance of all other approaches is very close to each other in all these figures, though there is still a clear gap between the optimal policy and the SSE policy. The next figures (d)-(f) show the variance of the EoP with respect to the scale of the game, under different target-resource ratios. Similar patterns can be observed from the results. In general, in these instances, the loss due to ignoring attacker manipulation appears to be insignificant, and the improvement brought by our approaches is marginal.
A more interesting set of results are shown in Figure 2 , in which we slightly tweak the randomly generated type set, by always adding a zero-sum attacker type in it. The small change leads to a very different pattern in the results. There is a very significant gap between the optimal and the SSE policies, and the QR policies normally rest in between them. The results corroborate our theoretical analysis, that all attacker types will be incentivized to report the zero-sum type when they are allowed to, which undermines the performance of the SSE policy significantly. The optimal policy, however, is able to achieve very high EoP, close to recovering the defender's truthful utility (EoP = 1) in many results. The QR policies are now able to provide significant improvement over the SSE policy, sometimes perform even better than the optimal policy; 4 however, the advantage collapses when there is a relatively large number of resources as shown in (f).
Algorithm Runtime. We also test the runtime of our algorithms. The results are shown in Figure 3 below. In each result, the time for computing the SSE is excluded as this is handled by an existing algorithm. Both our algorithms for computing the optimal policy and the QR policy exhibit good scalability, capable of solving problems with 5000 attacker types and 500 targets in a reasonable amount of time.
The computation of QR policy is extremely efficient thanks to its simplicity. 
Conclusion
This paper investigates manipulation to algorithms for learning the opponents' payoffs in Stackelberg security games and aims at providing a remedy for the overoptimistic assumption of a truthful attacker adopted by these algorithms. We build a novel game framework for this purpose, and propose exact and heuristic approaches to reduce the loss due to manipulation in this framework. The effectiveness of our approaches are evaluated both theoretically and empirically. We believe that our work opens a door to future research on similar models, especially variants of Stackelberg games.
A Appendix: Omitted Proofs
A.1 Auxiliary Results
Lemma A-1. Suppose (ĉ,î) ∈ arg max c∈C,i∈BR θ (c) u d (c, i) is an SSE on attacker type θ. The following holds:
(i) Ifĉ i < 1 for all i ∈ T , then {i ∈ T :ĉ i > 0} ⊆ BR θ (ĉ) and i∈Tĉ i = m.
(ii) Ifĉ i = 1 for some i ∈ T , then there exists j ∈ BR θ (ĉ) such thatĉ j = 1.
Proof. By definition,ĉ forms an SSE with someî ∈ BR θ (ĉ), i.e.,
We claim thatĉ is the optimal solution to the following linear program:
To see this, note that, first,ĉ satisfies all the constraints above: (A-1a) is equivalent toî ∈ BR θ (c), and (A-1b) and (A-1c) combined are equivalent to c ∈ C. Thus, it is a feasible solution. Second, the assumption thatĉ is not optimal would imply the existence of another feasible solution z =ĉ, such that
; this contradicts the assumption that (ĉ,î) forms an SSE. By the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions,ĉ is an optimal solution only if there exists constants (i.e., KKT multipliers) α i , β, γ i and δ i , each corresponding to an inequality constraint in (A-1a)-(A-1c), such that for all i ∈ T (let w a i = p θ i − r θ i and
Now we show (i) and (ii) in the statement of the lemma separately.
Part (i). Sinceĉ i < 1 for all i ∈ T , we have δ i = 0 for all i ∈ T by the last equation in (A-4). Suppose towards a contradiction that i∈Tĉ i < m. We would have β = 0 by the second equation in ( Similarly, if we supposeĉ t > 0 for some t ∈ T , but t / ∈ BR θ (ĉ), we would have u a θ (ĉ, t) < max i∈T u a θ (ĉ, i) = u a θ (ĉ,î). Thus, γ t = 0 and α t = 0 by the third and the first equations in (A-4), and further, β + δ t = 0 by the first equation in (A-2) (note that t =î since t / ∈ BR θ (ĉ)), which contradicts β > 0 and δ i = 0 for all i ∈ T as we have shown above.
Part (ii). Suppose thatĉ t = 1, t ∈ T , butĉ i < 1 for all i ∈ BR θ (c) (in particular,ĉî < 1). Thus, t / ∈ BR θ (ĉ), so u a θ (ĉ, t) < max i∈T u a θ (ĉ, i) = u a θ (ĉ,î). We have γ t = 0 and α t = 0 by (A-4), which implies β + δ t = 0 by (A-2); thus β = 0. In addition,ĉî < 1 implies δî = 0 by (A-4). Again, by (A-2), we end up with the contradiction that w d i + γî = 0.
Lemma A-2. Suppose c is a maximin strategy of the defender, i.e., c ∈ arg max c∈C min i∈T u d (c, i). Then (c, i) forms an SSE in a zero-sum game for any i ∈ BR β (c), where
Proof. Suppose (c, j), j ∈ BR β (c) is not an SSE. Thus, there exists z ∈ C and t ∈ BR β (z), such that u d (z, t) > u d (c, j) ; equivalently, u a β (z, t) < u a β (c, j) as β makes the game zero-sum. Since j ∈ BR β (c) and t ∈ BR β (z) are the attacker's best responses, we have u a β (c, j) = max i∈T u a β (c, i) and u a β (z, t) = max i∈T u a β (z, i) by definition; thus, max i∈T u a β (z, i) < max i∈T u a β (c, i). This leads to the following contradiction:
Corollary A-3. Suppose c is a maximin strategy of the defender and c is fully mixed. Then (c, i) forms an SSE in a zero-sum game for all i ∈ T , and
Proof. By Lemma A-2, (c, i) forms an SSE on attacker type
Since c is fully mixed, T = {i ∈ T : c i > 0}, and by Lemma A-1 (i), T ⊆ BR β (c) ⊆ T . Thus, BR β (c) ⊆ T , so (c, i) forms an SSE on attacker type β (i.e., in a zero-sum game) for all i ∈ T ; we have
Lemma A-4. Suppose c is a maximin strategy of the defender and c is fully mixed, i.e., 0 < c i < 1 for all i ∈ T . Then c is the only maximin strategy of the defender.
Proof. Suppose z = arg max c∈C min i∈T u d (c, i) is a maximin strategy and z = c. Thus, either: (i) z i ≥ c i for all i ∈ T , and this is strictly satisfied by some i; or (ii) z j < c j for some j ∈ T . We show either of them leads to a contradiction.
Since c is a maximin strategy, it is also an SSE defender strategy by Lemma A-2; and by Lemma A-1 (i), i∈T c i = m. Thus, in the former case, it follows immediately that i∈T z i > i∈T c i = m, which contradicts z ∈ C. In the latter case, we have
, where the last equality follows by Corollary A-3. This contradicts the assumption that z is a maximin strategy.
Lemma A-5. Let (ĉ,î) ∈ arg max c∈C,i∈BR θ (c) u d (c, i) be an arbitrary SSE on an attacker type θ ∈ Θ. For any policy π, truthful report guarantees a type-θ attacker his SSE utility, i.e., u a θ (π(θ)) ≥ u a θ (ĉ,î). Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that u a θ (π(θ)) < u a θ (ĉ,î). Let π(θ) = (z, t). For π to be feasible, t must be a best response of a type-θ attacker to z.
; since u a θ (·,î) changes continuously with the coverage of targetî, this implies the existence of a number ϕ ∈ (ĉî, zî],
. This leads to the following contradiction: max c∈C,i∈BR θ (c)
• The leader's utility only depends on the follower's action, with 3 F being the most detrimental action the leader would anyhow avoid the follower to choose, followed by 2 F . 1 F is the most preferred follower action.
• In the truthful setting, the only SSE strategy of the leader against any type-θ e follower (e ∈ E) is the pure strategy a 0 . When a 0 is played, the follower finds his best responses to be BR θs (a 0 ) = {3 F , 1 F }, so breaks the tie by playing j = 1 F . As a result, the leader's SSE utility on follower type θ e isû L (θ e ) = u L (a 0 , 1 F ) = 1.
• In the truthful setting, all leader strategies are SSE strategies on any type-θ ℓ follower (ℓ = 1, . . . , k). In an SSE, a type-θ ℓ follower always finds his best response to be 1 F , andû L (θ ℓ ) = 1 as a result.
• In the truthful setting, an SSE strategy of the leader on a type-θ 0 follower can be any i = 0. In an SSE, the follower finds his best response set to be {3 F , 2 F } and breaks the tie by playing j = 2 F . As a result,û L (θ 0 ) = 0.5.
Suppose that there exists a vertex cover V ′ = {v ′ 1 , . . . , v ′ k } ⊆ V of size k. The following leader policy π achieves EoP 1.
(a 0 , 1 F ), for each θ ∈ {θ e : e ∈ E}; (a v ′ ℓ , 1 F ), for each θ = θ ℓ ∈ {θ 1 , . . . , θ k };
(a 1 , 2 F ), for θ = θ 0 .
Clearly, all the outcomes prescribed are feasible, so π is a feasible policy. Further, it can be verified that when the leader applies π, the optimal reporting strategy of the follower is the following.
• For each type-θ e follower (e ∈ E), it is optimal to report a type θ ℓ such that v ′ ℓ ∈ V ′ is an end point of e. Such a θ ℓ always exists given that V ′ is a vertex cover. The leader obtains actual utility 1 on type θ e ; we have eop θe (π) = 1 as a result.
• For each type-θ ℓ follower (ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}), it is optimal to report truthfully. The leader obtains actual utility 1 and eop θ ℓ (π) = 1.
• For a type-θ 0 follower, it is optimal to report truthfully. The leader obtains actual utility 0.5 and eop θ 0 (π) = 1.
Therefore, EoP(π) = 1. Conversely, suppose that there exists a policy π with EoP(π) = 1. We show that there exists a vertex cover of G of size at most k. For EoP(π) = 1, we need eop θ (π) ≥ 1 for all θ ∈ Θ. Thus, the actual utility the leader obtains must be: at least 1 on each θ e and θ ℓ (ℓ = 0), and at least 0.5 on θ 0 . Now consider the reporting strategy of a type-θ 0 follower in response to π; let β ∈ Θ be the type a type-θ 0 follower is incentivized to report, and let π(β) = (x β , j β ). For the leader needs to obtain actual utility at least 0.5 on type θ 0 , we need j β ∈ {1 F , 2 F }. Observe that a type-θ 0 follower can already get utility 1 by reporting truthfully and responding with 2 F . Thus, a type-θ 0 follower would never report β if j β = 1 F ; and when j β = 2 F , he would be incentivized to report β only when x β a 0 = 0. Given this, a type-θ e follower (e = (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ E) is able to obtain utility 0.9 by reporting β. Let γ be the type a type-θ e follower is incentivized to report, and π(γ) = (x γ , j γ ); we therefore have u F θe (x γ , j γ ) ≥ 0.9. On the other hand, for the leader to obtain actual utility at least 1 on type θ e , we need j γ = 1 F , in which case u F θe (x γ , j γ ) ≥ 0.9 only if x γ av 1 + x γ av 2 = 1 (i.e., only the first row of the payoff matrix of θ e is chosen). Therefore, γ / ∈ {θ e : e ∈ E}, because this would lead to BR γ (x γ ) = {3 F } ∋ 1 F given that x that γ = θ ℓ for some ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Let π(θ ℓ ) = (x θ ℓ , j θ ℓ ), and let ∆ ℓ denote the support set of x θ ℓ for each ℓ. This establishes a mapping f from each e = (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ E to an ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, such that ∆ ℓ ⊆ {a v 1 , a v 2 }. For each ℓ ∈ {f (e) : e ∈ E}, let v ′ ℓ be an arbitrary vertex in {v ∈ V : a v ∈ ∆ ℓ }. The set of vertices {v ′ f (e) : e ∈ E} thus forms a vertex cover of size at most |{f (e) : e ∈ E}| ≤ k.
